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I
That many of the passages in the Digest are not in their original
state is no new discovery. Cujas and earlier writers were fully aware
of the fact, and there has been no age since the revival of learning in
which it has not been pointed out and illustrated. It is plain that there
must have been great alterations. Justinian's compilers were instructed
to make such changes as were necessary to bring the texts into accord
with the existing law. Practically all the material of the Digest was
from books written at least three centuries earlier. In the interval there
had been a vast amount of legislation, and a system of law which had
been created in the West, and was based on essentially Latin traditions,
was, from the time of Constantine onwards, elaborated in the East, in
a community in which the traditions and environment were essentially
Greek. In such conditions propositions of law must insensibly change
their content; terms become charged with new meanings and a new
spirit, and the most conservative editor, even though he intend no more
than the incorporation of the effects of legislation, will inevitably do
much more. It was not till about a century ago, when Savigny called
attention to the importance of these "Emblemata Triboniani" (now com-
monly called Interpolations) and gave several illustrations, that their
importance in the reconstruction of the classical law was recognized.
It was hardly indeed till the last quarter of the nineteenth century that
scholars concerned with the history of the Roman Law fully realized
the value of the instrument which the study of interpolations placed in
their hands. The remarkable results obtained by Lenel, Eisele, and
Gradenwitz, by the use of methods indicated by them, suggested similar
work to others, and before long a large number of such interpolations
had been indicated.2
I System Des heutigen Rdimischen Rechts (184o) 257 et seq.
'See Bonfante, Lezioni di Stora del Diritto Romano (1922) 83 for a bibli-
ography up to the outbreak of the European War.
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But this tool, like all others, may be misused. A writer with a thesis
to which the texts are recalcitrant readily convinces himself that some
of these have been altered, and the various tests, especially the linguistic
tests, began to be applied with excessive confidence, based on somewhat
hasty assumptions as to second and third century latinity, assumptions
all the more hazardous as the juristic writings dealt with were largely
the work of provincials. Then came a series of writings, especially
those of Kalb,3 in which the linguistic possibilities were reexamined.
In Die Jagd4 Kalb points out the danger and observes that the cer-
tainty that interpolations exist: "hat.. eine f6rmliche Jagd nach Inter-
polationen hervorgerufen und manche Gelehrte zu einer allzuweit-
gehenden Kritik verleitet." His writings, coupled with the fact that
a well-known text,5 whith had been generally denounced, proved by
discovery of the text in an earlier form not to have been affected in
doctrine by the compilers, led to a slackening of speed, and, for a time,
more sober methods prevailed. But the temptation is strong, and recent
years have seen a revival of a more hasty method, especially, as it seems,
in the Italian school. This school shows every sign of abundant vitality,
and of an effort, thoroughly justified by the results, to take its proper
place in a field of enquiry to which that people would seem to be pri-
marily called. For this fertility a certain price has been paid: in partic-
ular there seems to be too much readiness in the matter of interpola-
tions to take indications for proofs, to make too hasty inferences, and in
short to neglect the lessons of the immediate past. In the later part"
of this paper some attempt will be made to justify these criticisms which
are entirely consistent with a profound admiration for the work of the
Italian school.
One possible misconception must be pointed out. To say that the
compilers interpolated (the word is conveniently used to denote adding,
altering, and omitting) is not to say that they engaged in law reform.
They had a heavy task. They were to abridge, to harmonise, and to
bring up to date a vast mass of juristic writings. They completed their
work in three years, and it is hardly likely that they would have, or could
have, added to their burden that of law reform, of which there is no
hint in their instructions, which can still be read in the Constitution
Omnem ordinarily printed at the beginning of the Digest. Professor
Collinet, indeed, himself not an extremist in the matter of interpolations,
says in his Etudes Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien,6 what might
mean that the compilers definitely set themselves to mould the law in
the direction of Greek tradition. But in a course of lectures delivered
'Das Juristejlatein (1888); Roins Juristen (18go); Die Jagd nach Interpola-
tioneni (1897) ; Wegweiser in die R~mischex Rechtssprache (1912).
'Supra note 3, at p. 13.
'D. 15. I. 32. pr.
a i ibid. (1912). See especially pp. xxv et seq.
INTERPOLATIONS IN THE DIGEST
at Oxford7 he makes it clear that, in his view, the graecising interpola-
tions, the existence of which he has made it impossible to doubt, were in
the main taken over by the compilers from the edited texts produced by
their immediate predecessors of the school of Berytus, on which they
mainly relied, rather than on the originals. It can be seen from the Code
that a vast number of legislative changes, some of them on small points,
were made during the progress of the Digest, apparently in order to
smooth the way for the compilers. If it had been within their power to
make the changes, it is not easy to see why they should have been at
the pains to procure enactments. Where they did change the law it is
probable that they did so, in the main, unconsciously. They saw the
Roman texts with oriental eyes. Often, no doubt, what were intended
for mere explanations, were in fact changes of an existing rule which
they had not understood. The remark in the Institutes about the con-
tract literis is in all probability a case of this kind." To the editors,
a writing embodying a contract was itself the contract, and it did not
occur to them that the old rule which gave a similar practical result
was in point of legal. theory entirely different. But from these uncon-
scious changes to a plan of reform is a far cry. The view of Peters9
that the work of the compilers was much less ambitious than is com-
monly supposed and that in fact they worked on a previous compila-
tion-a predigest-is generally rejected.' 0  But that they were greatly
helped by preExisting collections made for instructional purposes, especi-
ally at Berytus, is a proposition gaining much acceptance" with the
corollary that a good deal of the interpolation which certainly exists
was really done before the compilers took the matter in hand. This
would explain how it was possible for them to do so great a work in so
short a time.' 2
But it is a secondary question whether the changes were made by
Tribonian and his colleagues or by their predecessors at Berytus. The
real question is one of scale. What is the extent of these changes?
Has there been a drastic overhauling of nearly all parts of the law?
Are the mass of equitable relaxations, so many of which are stated in
terms which have invited suspicion as to their genuineness, the work,
mainly, of the Byzantines? May we, from the existence of suspicious
words in a text infer a change of doctrine? The answer to these latter
questions seems to me negative.
It is not necessary,, if indeed it were possible, to set out in detail the
'The Geteral Problems raised by the codificatio of Justinian (1922) 4 TIJD-
scHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCH, I et seq.
23 . 1.
'Die Ostr3mische Digestentconmnentare und die Entstehung der Digesten (1913).
" Lenel, Die Entstehung der Digesten; (1913) ZEITS. DER SAV.-ST. (R6m. Anr.)
373 et seq.; Mitteis, Review of Peters' Work, ibid. 4o2 et seq.
"See Mitteis, loc. cit. supra note io.
12 Collinet, oe. cit. supra note 7.
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various tests or indications which have been used in the detection of
interpolations. Fresh points are constantly being made. An excellent
account of the matter will be found in the Lezioni of Bonfante,13 and in
H. Appleton's Interpolations dans les Pandectes (1895). An admirable
book, specially devoted to the subject, is Schulz, Einfilbrung in das
Studium der Digesten (I916), a work which, excellent as it is, betrays
in its title, as compared with its content, just that prepossession which
has led to some of the hastiness with which conclusions have been
reached in some recent work on Interpolations. The "study of the
Digest" is not, or should not be, merely the study of interpolations:
most of the Digest is in its original form.
Among the many tests, there are some which require much caution in
their use. Graecisms prove little, since many of the jurists were
Orientals. False tense sequence is by no means a monopoly of the
Byzantines. The "pluralis majestatis" is proof of compilers' activity,
for it shows that the Emperor, and not a jurist, is speaking. But it
must be clear that it is that particular plural. In view of the common
use of the plural by the jurists, in speaking of their views, 14 one needs
more evidence than one usually gets in the actual case, that the plural is,
in fact, "majestatis." Change of subject, omission of subject, pendent
ablative absolute, errors of grammar ("cum causale" with the indicative,
"licet" and "quia" with the wrong moods, etc.), all these are evidence
that the text has been altered, but, in view of the fact that the compilers
were abbreviating, they are very poor evidence of change of doctrine.
M. Collinet has shown that the omission of the word actio is charac-
teristic of the compilers, who say "furti tenetur" where a classic said
"actione furti tenetur."' 5 But this may have been done over and over
again for brevity, without other change. "Hodie" in the sense of
"nowadays" to indicate a change, without a reference to the event caus-
ing the change, will be discussed later. It is not to be denied that in
a great many cases in which one or more of these phenomena occur
there is substantial interpolation. All that is here maintained is that
the presence of such a fact is no more than a starting point: it needs
more than bad grammar in the text, and a strong conviction in the
commentator, to substantiate a material interpolation.
Where we get a laborious -clause with "quod" instead of the infinitive
construction, we are on firmer ground: the compilers are at least para-
phrasing and are probably doing more. Where a text begins in one
person and proceeds in another, there is interpolation, but it is not
' Supra note 2, and see Ch. V.14E. g., G. I. 30, 45, 63, 78, etc.; Paul, Vat. Fr. iii; Ulpian, Vat. Fr. 165;
Frag. Dos. 8, etc.
5 Un Nouveau Crit re d'Thterpretation: la Designation des Actions sans
"Actio" ou "Judicium" (1gIO) 34 NouVELLE REvuE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT
FRANCAIS ET ATRANGER, i57. Gaius makes the same omission. G. 3. 156; 3. 2o2;
3. 209. See also P. Sent. 2. 32. 15; S. 4. 9.
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always easy to say which part is new. In D. 18. 4. 21 the text begins
in the third person, passes to the first, and ends in the third. Some of
this is no doubt new, but which part? The matter has been the subject
of dispute, into which we need not go. Where a text reasons to one
conclusion and suddenly gives the other1 6 or, having said there is great
doubt, adds that there is none at all,"7 we may reasonably suspect the com-
pilers. Bad reasoning is not conclusive. When Paul says that there
is no actio redhibitoria where a slave sold has lost a tooth, since, if this
were a vitium, all babies must be defective, as they have no teeth at all,'I
we might easily put down this absurdity (for it is equally true of ina-
bility to walk), to some foolish Levantine, but for the fact that the
argument is attributed to Labeo by Aulus Gellius."9 It is often objected
to a text that the reasoning is not logical. That a proposition not
strictly logical cannot have been uttered by a jurist seems a doubtful
doctrine, not merely because every one is liable to error, but because the
law is not always strictly logical. No legal formula is adequate to deal
with the ever varying fact. When a combination of facts arises in
which the application of the accepted rule will give an unsatisfactory
result, there are but two ways of dealing with the matter. We may
take the line "Logic is logic, that's all I say !", as the English Courts
did in the recent betting cheque cases and in the Free Church case, when
legislation was needed to put things right.20 The logic in Cornfoot v.
Fowke2' seems impeccable, but the result was so unsatisfactory that the
case is treated as of no authority. Or we may "distinguish" which is
often the process of drawing a correct inference from premises one of
which is false. The result is a modification of the accepted rule, and
Dean Pound has shown us how this is brought about, often uncon-
sciously, under the pressure of contemporary tendencies of thought.
In Rome there was no case law, but though the machinery was different,
the process was substantially the same. It dates from the earliest times.
No one really believed in the absurd logic of the Pontiffs as recorded
by Gaius2 2 but the convenient rule was accepted. The same process
was no doubt going on in the classical age. It is not safe to infer
tampering from the fact that what a jurist says in one passage is not
wholly consistent with what he has said elsewhere. Still less safe is it,
though it is not uncommon, to assume that all inevitable logical deduc-
tions from an existing rule were in fact drawn. Well known texts
" E. g., D. 49. 8. i. i and 4, and see H. Appleton, Interpolations dats les Pan-
dectes (1895) 181 et seq.
TE. g., D. 13. 6. 22.
'ED. 21. I. II.
'"Noctes At. 4. 2. 12.
"o (i9o5) 5 Edw. VII, c. 12 (as to the Free Church case) ; (1922) 12 & 13
Geo. V, c. ig (as to betting cheques).
(184o, Exch. Ch.) 6 M. & W. 358.
2.54.
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warn us against both dangers. "Quod contra rationem iuris receptum
est non est producendum ad consequentia ;,23 "quae propter necessitatem
recepta sunt non debent in argumentum trahi."
24  And Julian tells us
that "non omniur quae a maioribus constituta sunt ratio reddi potest.
' '25
A connected objection is that a certain argument is not "logisch-
juristisch," "logico-giuridico." It is true that the law has a logic of its
own but this does not mean a special kind of logic, but only a special
form. Every science uses its own symbols. The salient features of
any group of facts are not the same for a lawyer and for a doctor.
When one sees propositions set out in a form which would not be
adopted by a skilled lawyer, or emphasising considerations which would
not affect a lawyer's mind, it is legitimate to infer that unskilled persons
have been at work. But there is a snake in the grass. There is more
than one kind of juristic thinking. The Common Lawyer, the French
Lawyer, trained in the Civil Code, the German Lawyer trained in the
Gemeines Recht, do not think quite alike, and none of them thinks quite
like the Roman. The danger is especially great with those trained in
Gerneines Recht, since that is a sort of Roman Law. A well-known
German jurist held that the notions of the German Law of Bankruptcy
must be applied to the analysis of Roman texts, in an attempt to ascer-
tain the classical law.2 6 Another deservedly eminent German writer,
discussing an edictal action on a slave's contract, the actio institoria,
applies to it modern notions of representation, though it is unlikely that
that was the Roman standpoint. He applies even the specially German
form of the conception. There must, he says, have been-notice of the
appointment, and that the transaction was for a certain principal. The
fact that there actually was an undisclosed principal "wfirde juristisch
gar keine Bedeutung haben. ' ' 27 The common law has had a good deal
to say of the undisclosed principal. Much caution is needed before
deciding' that a text is interpolated because it is "unjuristic :" it is not
easy to be sure that we "think their thoughts."
When one reviews the various doctrines which are said not to be
classical, but Byzantine, one is inclined to think that, if all this be true,
the jurists were not what they have been taken for. On this assump-
tion their achievement was hardly more than a severely logical, almost
scholastic, application of principles handed down to them by their more
fertile predecessors. It was the Byzantines, who, in a host of cases
in which the facts, though not within the rule, were within the equity
of it, suggested an actio utilis to meet the case. It was not the
Praetor, advised by jurists, who modified the effect of litis contestatio
in the actio de peculio, where justice certainly required this. It was
Paul, D. 5o. 17. 141.
2 Paul, D. 50. I7. 162.
" D. I. 3. 20.
"Von Tuhr, Actio de in rein verso (1895) 123 et seq.
"2 Karlowa, R~mische Rechtsgeschichte (igoi) 1129.
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not they, but the Byzantines, who reached the convenient conception
known as "constitutum possessorium." There are many similar cases.
If the most iconoclastic views are to be accepted, we must hold that the
classics did but little towards making a somewhat primitive set of rules
meet the needs of their time. It may be so, but some will be slow to
believe it on the evidence yet offered.
On the question of the scale on which doctrinal interpolations were
made some evidence, of which, however, it is easy to overestimate the
importance, is provided by the surviving classical texts which also occur
in the Digest (about one hundred and sixty-five) indicated in Girard,
Textes, and in the Collectio librorum iuris antejustiniani. Comparison
of these texts with their rendering in the Digest is easy, and it gives
results which seem worth attention. It would be tedious to set out all
the references, and it may be that a few have been omitted: the possible
error cannot be such as to vitiate the result. Of these texts about one
hundred and twenty-five show no change whatever of doctrine, though
most of them show changes of wording. In some cases explanatory matter
is added and, of a series of passages, some are often omitted. Some
of the differences of wording are no doubt variations in the manuscript
source, some are no doubt intended for improvement, and the explana-
tions may be new, or older glosses worked into the text. These changes
are important, as they show clearly that such alterations and additions,
even though shown to be by the compilers, do not indicate further altera-
tion of the text. A further twenty or so show doctrinal changes of
the kind one would expect from the instructions to the compilers.
Accounts of disputes are cut out or abridged. Usually the view stated
is that at which the original arrives, but sometimes a question left open
is settled. Allusions to obsolete institutions (manus, tutela mulierum,
civil bondage, adrogatio per populum, sponsores, fideipromissores, the
aerariun) are excised. So too are allusions to institutions abolished by
Justinian, e. g., maicipatio, bonitary ownership, latins, forms of legacy,
fiducia, actio rei uxoriae and the rule that parties to a stipulatio must
always be present. The last case is typical, for it shows that they
interpreted his legislation or the point erroneously, more graeco.
28
What had been praetorian reliefs appear with no indication of this.
Texts dealing with acquisition through filius, and on "nominatio" in
disherison, are altered in conformity with legislation. Sometimes illus-
trative cases are added. In all this there is no indication of reforming
activity. But in three of these texts, though it is true that the earlier
form is substantially reproduced, there is an additional clause modifying
the result, and in all probability, in form, Byzantine.
D. 35. 2. I. 9 (Vat. Fr. 68) following the earlier text, states a view
of certain early jurists on a point in usufruct, adopts a conflicting view
2 D. 44. 7. 2, where the statement of Gaius (3. 136.) that parties to stipulatio
must be present is omitted. Cf. C. 8. 37. 14. 2.
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of Aristo and Julian, and then adds what is not in the original, i. e., that
in operae servorum, as Aristo's rule cannot be applied, we must take
the view of the Veteres. This is sometimes said to be an interpolated
rule, but it is hard to see what other view can have been held by Paul,
who wrote the original.
D. 39. 5. 31. I (Vat. Fr. 254). Here a modifying clause is added,
but it expresses a change made by legislation.
2
D. 9. 2. 27. II (Col. 12. 7. 9). Here we are told, in accordance with
the earlier text, that if the slaves of a colonus set the property on fire,
the colonus is liable, with a right of noxal surrender. Then follow
words to the effect that if the colonus was negligent in his choice of
slaves for the work in hand he is directly liable. The language of this
is loose and inexact, for it seems to make it negligence even to own an
incompetent slave. There can be little doubt that this is Byzantine work,
but it is only an inaccurate expression of the doctrine of culpa in eligendo.
There remain about twenty texts in which the doctrine of the earlier
text is altered, and this is not due to one of the elementary fundamental
changes above stated, so that it is not immediately clear that the com-
pilers as such were not responsible for the change. They need brief
examination:
D. 22. 5. 17 (Ulp. Reg. 20. 6). A rule as to capacity of witnesses in
the mancipatory will is widened (obsolete points being omitted) by the
words "vel eodem negotio," so as to cover all transactions. But in the
original text the rule is stated as an application of a general rule to a
specific case.
D. 3. 5. 36. i (P. Sent. 1. 4. 3). The original says that if A is
managing B's business, and lends money on his behalf, the risk is with
A if the debtor is insolvent at the time of action. The Digest says that
A is so responsible unless the insolvency arose after the transaction,
and the wording "fortuitis casibus" is held to suggest that this is com-
pilers' work and not the full statement of a rule abridged in the
Sententiae. But the rule is not new. It is not true that "in bonae fidei
iudiciis convenit" that a gestor who has invested the funds with due
caution should be responsible for loss from "casus fortuitus." We are
elsewhere told that gestor, guardian, and agent are not responsible for
"casus fortuitus." The texts, third century rescripts,30 do not purport
to enact anything new and even if they are interpolated, which is entirely
unproved, they were presumably in the first edition of the Code, and our
text does not indicate any initiative in reform on the part of the com-
pilers of the Digest as such. It is probably a case in which the Digest
is nearer the original than the abridgement of the Sententiae is.
D. 48. io. i8. 1 (P. Sent. 3. 6. i5). Paul says that one who, writing
C. Th. 8. 13. 1 and 4. See Girard, Manual Elenentaire de Droit Romain (6th
ed. 1918) 96o, note 8.
' C. 2. 18.22; 4.35. 13; 5.38.4.
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a will, inserts a provision that he is to be tutor, is removed: ultro videtur
adfectasse. The Digest adds that, if worthy, he can still be appointed
ex decreto, though not ex testamento, and he can plead no excuse. The
words have no indication of interpolation and are not generally thought
to be interpolated. They may well have been in the original text though
they are not in the scrappy title in the abridgement which we have.
D. 20. 3. 5. (P. Sent. 5. 1. I) ; D. 48. 19. 38. 9 (P. Sent. 5. 25. IO).
Here there are capricious looking substitutions of relegatio for
deportatio and vice versa. In classical law punishments varied greatly
according to the rank of the offender,31 and it may be that a varying
selection has been made.
'D. 22. 5. 16 (P. 5. 15. 5 = Coll. 8. 3). The earlier text gives a
number of punishments for false witness. The Digest substitutes "a
iudicibus competenter puniuntur." This interpolation expresses only
a long standing tendency to give iudices discretion in criminal matters.32
D. 48. 18. 18. 4 (P. Sent. 5. 16. 2). Paul says that servi hereditarii
may be tortured if necessary-by index tutelaris or centumviri. The
Digest widens this, by saying merely "iudex." Slaves could be tortured
to get their evidence. Paul's statement is not a limitation but an exten-
sion. He means that the rule against examining slaves for or against
their masters does not bar examinations of slaves of a hereditas, in
disputes as to tutela under the will.
D. i8. 6. 19. I (Vat. Fr. 12). The doctrine is reversed, but this is
not due to the compilers.3 3 The rule does not seem to be interpolated
there, but in any case the change, if there is one, was not due to the
compilers of the Digest as such.
D. 12. 6. 26. 3 (Vat. Fr. 266). The original says that money paid,
where there was a perpetua exceptio, can be recovered. The Digest
adds that this is not so, if the payer knew of the exceptio. This is
classical.3 4
D. 3. 2. I. pr. (Vat. Fr. 320). It is doubtful whether these texts
are the same. In any case, apart from mere corruptions in the Vatican
Fragments, the only change is that the Vatican version deals with exclu-
sions from the office of, or appointment of, cognitores, while, in the
Digest, the acts stigmatised are merely said to create infamia. This
well-known change is not due to the compilers: it is continuing a prac-
tice dating from soon after classical times35
D. 9. 2. 5. pr. (Coll. 7. 3. 2-4). The important change is that the
Collatio discusses the rule of the twelve Tables, allowing killing of a
nocturnal thief, or of one who by day defends himself with arms, and
See Coil. passin.
See Mommsen, Rrniisches Strafrecht (1899) 1o38 et seq.
"Krager, collectio librorum; iuris aut ejustimnuni (i89o) ad Vat. Fr. 12, shows
that it follows C . -24. pr. (Diocletian).
See, e. g., G. 3. 91.
"Girard, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 202.
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notes that Pomponius doubts if the rule be still in force. Acting
apparently on this suggestion, the compilers suppress the discussion
and, for the words "si quis noctu furem occiderit" substitute the words
"et si metu quis mortis furem occiderit." There is nothing new in this.
D. 22. 5. 3. 5 (Coil. 9. 2. 2). The texts are not the same, but they
cite the same enactment in different terms. It excludes some persons
from giving evidence under the 1. lulia de vi. Apart from differences
immaterial to the present purpose, the Digest excludes those freed by
the accused or his parens, while the Collatio seems also to exclude those
freed by his liberti. The Collatio text is not certain, but there was
clearly some such extension. If it is classical, it had disappeared long
before Justinian. There is no trace of it in the enactments of C.
Theodosianus in which the point is handled.36
D. 28. 3. 17 (Papin. Resp. 5. 4. 14). This deals with omission of
a son in a will. If he claims, the will is void. If he does not, and
here the manuscript of the Responsa becomes illegible except for the
last three letters of the sentence: "tat." But the Digest proceeds:
"licet subtilitas iuris refragari videtur, attamen voluntas testatoris ex
bono et aequo tuebitur." The turgid language suggests the compilers
(though D. 15. I. 32. pr. stands as a warning) and there is nothing
corresponding to the "tat" of the Responsa. The sentence there is
shorter and it seems likely that it was a statement that someone "dubitat."
The compilers may have decided the doubt. The text is not in the
Basilica.
The remaining three texts raise an important question, already hinted
at. Where the independent source is of a secondary or in any
way inferior character, it is not unlikely that the text in the Digest is
nearer the original than the independent source is. This is specially
true of the Collatio, of which We have no manuscript earlier than the
ninth century, though it seems to have been compiled about the end of
the fourth. It does not appear to be the work of a lawyer and the
manuscripts are full of corruptions.
D. 9. 2. 27. 17 (Coil. 2. 4). Both texts say that the Aquilian action
lies only for damnum, and that therefore if harm is done to a slave of
no value there is no Aquilian action. The Collatio then proceeds:
"ergo et si pretio quidem non sit deterior servus factus verum sumptus
in salutem eius et sanitatem facti sunt, in haec nec mihi videri damni
Aquilia lege (agi) posse." The Digest says after the remark above
paraphrased: "Aquilia enim eas ruptiones, quae darmnadant persequitur
Ergo etsi pretio quidem non sit deterior servus factus verum sumptus
in salutem eius et sanitatem facti sunt, in haec mihi videri damnum
datum: atque ideoque lege Aquilia, agi posse." The doctrine is
reversed. The conclusion in the Collatio follows naturally on the
"ergo." The contrary conclusion in the Digest follows equally naturally
E. 9., 4. ID. 2; 9. 6. 4.
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on the "ergo," on account of the proposition "Aquilia enim . . . perse-
quitur." The solution in the Digest is the rational one, and it is in
harmony with recorded classical doctrine. The proposition in the Colla-
tio is absurd. Any one who thinks that a slave can be so injured that
expense will be incurred in curing him, without effect on his market
value, will be undeceived when he takes the slave to market. To make
the rule intelligible it must be understood to mean that damage did not
bring in the Aquilian claim unless it was permanent. But Gaitis tells
us that the action lies if the res is "quoquo modo vitiata" or the
slave "aliqua parte corporis laesus."
7  It is the damnum to the owner
which is in question: "si quis alteri damnum faxit, quod usserit"
etc.8 Erogationes come into account?
9 and it is indifferent that the
slave has now recovered.40  Altogether it seems clear that the Digest
text is the correct one. Possibly the clause before the "ergo" having
been dropped by accident, the "nec" was inserted to make sense.
D. 9. 2. 27. 8 (Coil. 12. 7. 3). There is here a small change which
may be a restoration of the original: it makes the text clearer and more
significant. The Collatio says: "si quis insulam voluerit exurere et
ignis etiam ad vicini insulam pervenerit," he is liable ex Aquilia, "vicino
et iam non minus inquilinis ob res eorum exustas." The Digest inserts
"meam" after "voluerit." Thus the point is that it was intended to
do harm to one person and another was injured. The fact that there
was no intent to harm him is no reply to his action. In the Collatio,
the point is obscure: it might be his own house he set on fire. There is
no reason to suppose a change in law.
D. 23. 3. 33 (Schol. Sin. 12. 33). This is not the case of two versions
of a text: it is one version and the remarks of a late Greek scholiast from
which may be inferred, with more or less confidence, what the text said.
Ulpian would appear to have said, after declaring the husband liable,
in some cases, if a promisor of dos adventitia became insolvent after he
could properly have been sued, that this is equally true of dos promised
by the pater, if given as dos adventitia. The Digest denies that he can
ever be so liable if the dos is from the pater. But it shows that the view
rejected was that of Julian, and that adopted and shortly stated was that
of Sabinus. It seems also to be that of Ulpian. Elsewhere he defines
dos adventitia as that from an outside source.
41
This concludes the list. The texts are numerous and widely dis-
tributed (thirty-six books of the Digest are represented) and the con-
clusion from our review is that they show very little evidence of any
reforming activity in the compilers or their predecessors at Berytus,
or of a tendency to graecise the law. But they are very few in
relation to the bulk of the Digest and no further inference can
be drawn. It is certain that they did make alterations, and that they
= 3. 217, 219. ' D. 9. 2. 45. I.
'See Grfiber, Lex Aquilia (1886) 233. Ulp. Reg. 6. 3.
'D. 9. 2. 33. pr.
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did introduce Greek ideas. No one can doubt this after study of M.
Collinet's work, already cited,4 2 and that work does not by any means
stand alone. The only conclusion that it is desired to draw is that, on
the whole, the presumption is against an alleged interpolation of doc-
trine, and that the case for any such must be clearly made out before it
is entitled to acceptance. In such conditions the most exact reason is
called for. In the following pages an attempt is made to show, not
that the allegations of interpolation now being made from all sides are
mistaken, but that in the ardor of the chase much reasoning of a hasty
character has found its way into print, and that this hunt for interpola-
tions exercises a demoralising effect on the work not only of inexperi-
enced writers, but on that of men whose merit is recognized wherever
Roman Law is read.
II
It unfortunately happens (indeed it is the thesis of these pages) that
the field for selection is very large. The tendency to which attention
is drawn in these pages is of course most marked in those writers whose
primary object is the discovery of interpolations, but it is evident else-
where and it is difficult to avoid an uneasy feeling that younger writers
are allowing themselves to be satisfied in these matters with a loose
method because it appears to satisfy their seniors.
Dr. Ebrard has studied to very good purpose in a very good school.
But his excellent book Die Digestenfragmente ad formulam hypothe-
cariam (1917) contains several cases of slapdash argument in the matter
of interpolations, and, in particular, of a readiness to reject words and
texts on which suspicion has once been cast, no matter what may have
been said about them since. He discusses D. 15. I. 32. pr. which allows
the actio de peculio to be renewed in a certain case. 3 The language is
inflated and, though opinions varied as to the classicality of the rule,
nearly everyone agreed that the language could not be that of Ulpian
or of Julian whom he is quoting. A few years ago a fragment of the
text in an earlier form was discovered, substantially the same. The
fragment appears to be of late in the fourth or early in the fifth century.
This at any rate clears Tribonian and for most people raises a presump-
tion of genuineness. But Ebrard sets out to show that it is a pre-Jus-
tinian interpolation. He calls the text in the Digest, "eine liingst als
unecht bekannte Stelle" and cites a number of writers who hold it such.
But all these wrote before the discovery of the fragment (except
Beseler) and the situation is entirely changed by the discovery. To
show that the fragment is not genuine he says that it is improbable that
the fragment is from Ulpian himself, since paleographic considerations
show it to be of the fifth century. Why should this make it improbable?
'Supra P. 34.3. "3 At p. 4o, note 28.
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Of how much ancient literature, legal or not, have we manuscript
evidence nearer the source? Yet this is the whole argument.
On D. 2o. I. 13. 5: "Si sub condicione debiti nomine obligata sit
hypotheca, dicendum est ante condicionem non recte agi, cum nihil
interim debeatur; sed si sub condicione debiti condicio venerit, rursus
agere poterit," he says4 that here we know the earliest time when this
interpolation can have been made, since it was in A. D. 486-7 that Zeno
abolished the destructive effect of litis contestatio in plus petitio tempore.
He does not note that there is other good authority for the view that the
condition by its arrival created a new obligation and the action could be
renewed.45 In fact the equivocal nature of a condition obligation is
notorious.46 We are not concerned with the question whether there has
or has not been interpolation, but only with this particular argument.
Ebrard has in fact a good deal more to say on the point itself.
On D. 13. 7. 17 he observes47 that it is "ausserordentlich fehlerhaft,"
and, in a certain sense, so it is: "sane divi Severus et Antoninus rescrip-
serunt ut sine diminutione mercedis soli obligabitur." "Ut . . . obli-
gabitur" is impossible. But as editors have pointed out, the "ut" is
in the wrong place: the text should be read "sane, ut divi Severus et
Antoninus rescripserunt, sine" etc. Ebrard observes this but adds that
this makes the "hdufig verdichtig sane nur urn so auffllliger." Why?
It seems entirely in place. The fact is that Seckel has thrown suspicion
on "sane" 48 and this seems to settle the matter. The fact that. "sane"
is not a word used by Justinian in the Code, and is "ungemein hdufig"
among the classical jurists, pointed out by Kalb,49 though noted by
Ebrard, is not allowed to offset his argument.
Steiner, Datio in solutum (1914) is a work marked in general by
very careful analysis, but, on the first clause of D. 13. 5. I. 5, he
remarks 0 in order to show that it is interpolated that it harmonises ill
with the historical evolution of Datio in solutum. The extinctive effect
on obligation of a datio in solutum is, he says, almost as old as that of
solutio itself. It cannot therefore have been the recognition of this
which did away with the difficulty in admitting a constitutum for some-
thing other than what was due; otherwise this would have become
permissible so soon as the actio de pecunia constituta was created.
Apart from the historical question as to the antiquity of datio in solutum,
as to which some evidence might have been expected, the significant
"At p. io5.
"D. 21. i. 43. 9. The texts in fact conflict in some degree. See, e. g., D. 44.
7. 42. pr. and Inst 4. 6. 33b, where the words "vel sub condicione" which make
this a case of plus petitio tempore are supposed by KrUger to be due to Justinian.
" See Girard, op. cit. supra note 29, at pp. 483 et seq.
4T At p. 115.
'Heumann-Seckel, Handlexicon (914) sub voce.
Die Jagd nach Interpolatonen, 24.
"At p. 88.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
point is, that this argument assumes that all logical inferences which
could be drawn from an existing rule were actually drawn.
Vassali (whom it would be impertinent of me to praise) in his Misc.
critica (1917) maintains5' the very probable thesis that the word
"impersonaliter," wherever it purports to be said by a jurist, is inter-
polated. It is not unlikely indeed that it often merely replaces a longer
formula, e. g., "sine ulla adiectione personae," and any inference of
doctrinal change drawn from the use of this word is rather hazardous.
The thesis in support of which this interpolation is maintained is that in
classical law any stipulation had to indicate the person who was acquir-
ing through the stipulation, except indeed where it was between two
cives or the stipulator was a slave in whom there was no lesser or other
interest than that of one owner so that there could be no doubt who
acquired and the indication was implied. Accordingly he declares inter-
polated a number of texts in which a slave with two owners stipulates
and there is discussion of the effect where this is without any "adiectio
personae." Apart from the latinity of the texts themselves Vassali's
main arguments are two. The intentio in the formula "si paret N. N.
Ao. Ao. X dare oportere" proves, he says, that in the stipulatio itself
"il complemento 'mihi' o altro correspondente risulta da inserire." It
is difficult to follow this argument, which looks like a petitio principii.
The iudex must be satisfied that Agerius is the person entitled, but the
argument assumes what ought to have been proved, i. e., that an adiectio
personae was the only way in which this could be done. The question
who acquired under the stipulation of a common slave was settled by
well-known riles. And the slave's "mihi dari spondes ?" would give the
iudex no more information on the point than would "dari spondes ?"
He further remarks on G. 3. 103: "praeterea inutilis est stipulatio si ei
dari stipulemur cuius iuri subiecti non sumus," that the rule could not
have been "utilmente" framed in this manner unless the stipulatio had
stated the person to whom the datio was to be made. This is of course
perfectly true, but no one denies that there might be an adiectio personae
or indeed that there commonly would be one. This particular point
could not arise unless there was such an adiectio. There are other texts
with which Vassali should have dealt. In D. 45. 3. 17 there is a stipu-
latio by a common slave "sine adiectione nominis nostri." This does
not in terms exclude the use of "mihi," but the stipulatio was for a
right of way and was valid. A slave could not validly stipulate "sibi"
for a "ius. '5 2 In D. 45. 3. 7. I the text runs "sine ulla adiectione pure
stipulatus sit" servus comnmunis, and it is valid. Gaius persistently
gives the form of stipulatio without any adiectio though one would have
expected statement of a rule so fundamentally affecting the formation
of a contract. So does Paul in Vat. Fr. 98. Vassali holds that Gaius
is merely stating the invariable parts of the stipulatio, but the most
a' Fast. 3, PP. 37 et seq. M45. 1. 38. 6-.9.
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natural inference is that there was no such rule. Vassali makes it clear
that the verb ("dari," etc.) would be in the passive, but this does not
seem to affect the present point.
Albertario may be treated as representative of the most advanced
Italian school. His contributions are numerous and valuable, but he is
specially interesting as his work seems to show a progressive increase of
confidence in the hunt for interpolations, as such, and in a recent work
he invites greater confidence in the "metodo interpolazionistico, anche
quando non disdegna certe audacie"5 3 Italian works are sometimes
difficult to come by, either because printed in small numbers or because
the Italian book trade has not adopted modem methods of distribution,
and Albertario's Hodie I have not been able to get. But his argument
is set out and accepted by Mitteis,5 4 as follows:
"Hodie" in the sense of nowadays, used to introduce a statement of a
new rule of law, is found both in Justinianian texts and in classical
texts. But in classical texts it is always, with a few easily explained
exceptions, accompanied by the naming of the source of new law. But
in the Institutes, Justinian, out of nine uses by him, only twice cites the
changing enactment. From this Albertario infers that where "hodie"
in the Digest is thus supported.it-is genuine, i. e., in ten cases, and
where it is without this support, i. e., in twenty-six cases, it is inter-
polated.
On this Mitteis observes that Albertario's results have provided
a new criterion of interpolation. It should be added that most
of the twenty-six texts had already been doubted, and Albertario sets
out to show on various grounds that the rest are no better. Our only
concern however is with the "hodie" argument. If we accept Alber-
tario's facts, we are still entitled to object to the reasoning. From the
proposition that classics using "hodie" in this sense nearly always
support it, and that Justinian rarely does so, it is impossible to infer
that in all cases in the Digest in which it is "naked" it is interpolated.
It is perhaps this consideration which makes Albertario in a later publica-
tion55 put the matter more strongly and assert that in all the classical
texts the "hodie" is supported. But the facts are not as he states them.
"Hodie" in this sense occurs at least twelve times in the Institutes. In
six of these the legislation is mentioned. 56 Thus in half the cases the
legislation is stated. But that is not all. In two others57 the cause
of the change was not legislation but desuetude and the fact of desuetude
is stated. In two others"8 we do not know that there was any legisla-
tion and the use in both cases of the word "observare" strongly suggests
Due Osservazioni sul Frag. de Form Fabiana (192o) 5.
'Review of Albertario's Work (1912) 33 ZEITS. DER SAV.-ST. (R6m. ABT.) 636.
Albertario's work was published in 1911.
(1912) 25 BULLE.rrNO DELL ISTITUTO D-DIRITTO ROMANO, 241.
"I. 11.2; 2. 14. pr.; 3.7.4; 3. 9. pr.; 3.21 (second use); 4. 13. 1O.
.3. 21 (first use); 4. i. 4.
W 4. 11.2; 4. 15.4a. Cf. 4. 1. 4.
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that there was not. In another the reason is expressly given: "super-
vacuum est hodie dicere, nam. . ."I In the same text "hodie" is used
again and there the legislation ought to have been mentioned: it seems
to be the only case in which Justinian followed what Albertario con-
siders to have been his habitual practice.
It is much the same with the texts independent of Justinian. Where
there is an express enactment it is usually cited.60 But where the
change is due to jurisprudence or to desuetude this is usually left to
be inferred. In Vat. Pr. I56 the rule said to be "hodie in usu" is not
due to the statute mentioned, but to juristic practice. In Ulp. 20. 2
there is no statute to mention and the language is similar to that of
Inst. 3. 21. pr. init., and 4. I. 4. In P. 5-24, (which has however
probably been altered), the method said to exist "hodie" seems not to be
the result of the 1. Pompeia, but of change from its provisions, intro-
duced by practice.61
The obvious conclusion is that there was no great difference between
the classical practice and that of the Institutes. Unsupported "ho'e"
in this sense has long been held suspicious. It suggests interpolation
only where we know there was a statute and this is not mentioned.
But the interpolation may well be only the omission of a reference which
seemed useless. For the classical lawyers, the legislation is their
authority. For Justinian the source of the provision is immaterial:
his book is an enactment.
In 25 BULLETTINO DELL ISTITUTO DI DIRITTO ROMANO, page 17, he
discusses D. i6. 3. 1. 6. which states that a pact for liability for culpa
in deposit is valid. He does not accept this for classical law. One of
his arguments is that the immediately following words, "contractus
enim legem ex conventione accipiunt," are commonly held interpolated
and the word "enim" so links the two passages together that it is
difficult to suppose them from different authors. The jurist, he says,
must have given his reason: why should the compilers erase it and give
another? But jurists very commonly give no reason and the Digest
contains a large number of reasons added by the compilers6 2 He
objects to the form "in deposito," not without predecessors, yet it seems
very- like "in hereditate" in G. 3. 64 and other passages in that neigh-
borhood. He cites as evidence of interpolation of the same form in
D. 3. 2. 6. 6, the fact that in the previous passage Ulpian is discussing
only mnandati condemnatus, and here he cites both mandate and deposit.
Thus deposit is an addition. It may be pointed out that he cites also
tutela and societas and that these four are precisely the relations dis-
cussed together in the clause of the Edict on which Ulpian is comment-
4. 15. 8 (first use).
"G. 2. i95; Ulp. i. io; i1. 8; 17. 2; Vat. Fr. 125, I27, 128, and possibly Coll.
15.2. I.
Mommsen, op. cit. supra note 32, at p. 923.
H. Appleton, op. cit. supra note i6, at p. -29.
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ing. 3 On page _6 he discusses D. 17. I. 39 and holds, not without
probability, that it dealt originally with fiducia. He supports this by
an argument drawn from the alleged fact that the text at first considers
mandatum alone and then proceeds to talk about deposit also. In fact
it speaks of both throughout.
On page 35 he discusses pacts not to be liable for dolus which are
clearly void, and holds that texts which say that there could be a valid
pact not to bring actio depositi are interpolated.64 But it is one thing
to contract out of liability beforehand and another to agree, after the
fact, for release, and this is the distinction intended in D. 2. 14. 7. 15
as appears from the concluding words of h. t. 14: "nam et de furto
pascisci lex permittit." And D. 2. 14. 27. 3 means the same thing in
saying that a pact not to bring actio depositi is valid though it may oper-
ate as if there had been a pact not to be liable for dolus.
In 26 BULLETTINO, 1o6, Albertario maintains that all cases of joint
wrong in which payment by one discharged the others are due to Jus-
tinian: the release being the work of the compilers. In D. 4. 2. 14. 15,
he holds that Ulpian said that in metus satisfaction by one did not
release the others, and that h. t. 15 is entirely the work of the compilers.
In 4. 3. 17. pr. Ulpian appears to say the same for dolus and here too
Albertario holds that he really said the opposite. The principles as to
cumulation in penal actions are much controverted. Here it is enough
to say that dolus and msetus are not delicts, in the strict sense: the
Praetor could no more create a delict than he could create a contract,
and that though text-books commonly lay down the rule of absolute
cumulation for "penal actions" they give usually no authority which
justifies this. 3 In dolus the action lies only if "non aliter res servari
potest."66  Will it lie when the res is already servata? If two persons
commit a dolus and a third party comes to their relief and puts the
matter right, are they both still liable? The payment in such cases is
a means of avoiding liability rather than payment of damages. The
case may possibly be different where the payment is under the action: it
satisfies another obligation, that arising from the litis contestatio.67 It
is also no doubt different in those praetorian wrongs which are based on
civil law. But liability for dolus and metus depends entirely on the
words of the Edict.
In a study of Actio de Universitate e Actio specialis in rem (1919)
Albertario maintains, with others, that the conception of the hereditas as
an abstract unity consisting of rights and duties is post-classical. He has
occasion to refer to the word "universitas" as applied to a community,
and holds that here too it meant in classical law only the people who
'D. 3. 2. I.
D. 2. 14. 7. I5; h. t. 27.3.
, See on these texts, Levy, Konkurrenz (1922) 2. I. at p. 81.
D. 4.B3. S. 8; h. t. 5.'See Biondi, Studi sile Actiones arbtrariae (1913) 42 et eq.
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made up the community. On G. 2. I I he says that Gaius does not mean
the universitas in a corporate sense but only the people who make it up.
The text runs "Quae publicae sunt, nullius in bonis sunt: ipsius enim
universitatis esse creduntur." Apart from the awkwardness of saying,
as Albertario understands the text, that what belongs to all does not
belong to any, there is the difficulty of the word "ipsius." It presumably
has a meaning and it seems precisely to signify the corporate character
which Albertario denies. Gaius clearly has corporate character in mind,
as he has in D. 50. 16. 16: "civitates enim privatorum loco habentur." and
in the obscure D. 3. 4. I where he is discussing the corporate character
of some bodies.6
Even as to the conception of hereditas the real trend of Albertario's
argument is rather to show that the word "universitas" was not applied
by classical lawyers to the hereditas than to show that this was not :n
effect conceived of as an abstract whole and not as a mere aggregation of
property. The passage of Gaius in which he is discussing res incor-
porales69 and in which he mentions hereditas as his first example seems
to call for explanation. It is not easy to see how a mere aggregation
of physical objects could have been a res incorporatis. It is difficult
to resist the conclusion that, for Gaius, the hereditas was a unity,
whether he would have included the debts or not.
On pages 7 and 64 of this essay, Albertario observes, quoting Ferrini,
Rotondi and Bonfante, that late western sources show a "stretto
parallelismo" in their doctrine with the post-classical doctrines from
oriental sources. He quotes Rotondi's words, "Nonostante le profonde
diversitA nell' evoluzione degli instituti nelle due parti dell'impero. ]a
dogmatica giuridica pur nelle sue aberrazioni piu singolari e sostanzial-
mente uniforme." If this indeed were so, it would be something like
a miracle. A much more probable view is that one of these systems
borrowed the notions from the other, and for historical reasons this
would mean that the East borrowed 'them from the West. On that
view they were known to western jurisprudence before the two systems
started on their separate journeys. If they are post-classical they are
not very late and it is absurd to call them Byzantine which indeed
Albertario does not, though others are less careful. The terminology
"actio de universitate," "actio specialis in rem," was not invented in the
East. It may be post-classical: it does not follow that the idea which it
expresses was."0
Other writers of the Italian school have been similarly active in this
matter, but none of them approaches in whole-heartedness a recent
German writer, Gerhard Beseler, who must at least be acquitted of
68 1 Mitteis, Riinisches privairecht bis auf die Zeit Diokletianw (9o8) 376.
2 2. 14.
0 Much space has here been given to Albertario: the justification is that he is
a very distinguished writer who has long since given us the right to expect clear
thinking and close reasoning.
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paying too much respect to his seniors. This author brings to the task
an exceptionally good equipment, both philological and juristic, but
his method seems open to a good deal of criticism, which indeed it has
received. His principal work on the matter is his Beitrdge zur Kritik
der Rimischen Rechtsquellen of which four Heften have as yet
appeared.71 The author's first principle is a repudiation of the view pro-
pounded by Kalb, and widely accepted, that search for interpolations,
as such, is unsound and likely to give untrustworthy results; that the
sound method is to start from investigation of the history of doctrine
and to infer interpolation from this with the help of linguistic tests,
with a resulting interaction by which one checks the other. An obvious
corollary is that pure linguistic tests are suspicious. All this Beseler
repudiates. Not only is direct hunting his method: it is expressly
declared to be the proper plan 72 and linguistic tests are declared all
sufficient.7" It is difficult to avoid the impression that with the assump-
tions he makes his task is an easy one: they are so far-reaching as
almost to exclude the possibility of effective check. To the plain man
a comparison with the existing literature of the silver latinity seems a
good touchstone by which to judge whether a "classical" jurist could
have used a particular word or idiom. But this road is closed to
Beseler's critics. The classical jurists were "Attizisten strenger Obser-
vanz." 74  This means not merely that they wrote a very pure Latin,
but that their vocabulary is far more strict than that of the lay writers.
Even "atquin" though a good enough word for golden latinity is too
"unruhig" for a classical jurist.75  Cicero is no guide: he is given to
Greek forms, no Atticist and no jurist.76 What Vergil, Quintilian,
Pliny'the younger might have said is no guide to what a jurist could
say.7   The lay Atticists of their own age are not Atticists in the same
sense.7 - If the Digest contains some of these forms, possible to laymen
but not to the lawyers, these are mere reminiscences among the
Byzantine jurists of the Latin lessons of their school days.79  No reli-
ance can be placed even on the pre-Justinian legal texts, for Gaius.
besides having undergone contamination, was a "Graecist"' ° and was
not observant as other lawyers were of the proper "consecutio tem-
porum,"' ' and the other texts, Ulpian's Regulae, the Vatican Fragments,
the Collatio have all undergone post-classical revision, a very prob-
*1 910, 1911, 1913, 1920. 762 ibid. 8.
. 4 Beitrdge zur Kritik, etc. 303. V 3 ibid. 95, 201; 4 ibid. IgI, 255.
.3 4 ibid. 117. _14 ibid. 315.
743 ibid. 3, etc. 13 ibid. II2.
734 ibid. 191.
so 2 ibid. 62, 64. The ability to write impeccable Latin is, it seems, part of the
definition of a "classical" jurist. In (1923) ZEITS. DFR SAv.-ST. (R6M. ABT.) 421
Gaius, who wrote in the second century, is described as "der Nicht-klassiker
Gains."814 ibid. 159.
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able opinion, the Sententiae of Paul being indeed, not a work of
Paul, but a florilegium by a post-classical Rhetor out of the works of
Paul.8 2 However, the Atticism of the classical jurists has its limits.
Papinian is no guide for Ulpian, for he is inclined to the "constitutional",
style, and Scaevola is given to original forms, so that the thesis does not
fully apply to them.8 3 It does not even wholly apply to Ulpian himself,
fof some of his books (Opiniones, De officio curatoris reipublicae, De
omnibus tribunalibus) are not in the classical style, probably they are
post-classical collections.8 " Apart from this Ulpian is the real classic,
no mere bungler and forerunner of Tribonian, as Erman says,85 or
defective in style as Binding says. 6 The days when people thought
this are over. Finally, one who does not accept all this has no
"Stilgefiihl" and no right to an opinion. 17 It is clear that a writer with
all these assumptions cannot easily be proved in the wrong. It is how-
ever possible that not all these assumptions are true. One of Beseler's
critics asks, "Who told Beseler that he knew Ulpian's style better than
I do ?" The present writer cannot take this position: he is willing to
admit that Beseler is much better qualified. But-one would have more
confidence in his views on Ulpian, if he had produced some specimens
of this splendidly pure Atticistic, highly improbable, Ulpian whose Latin
was so good that Quintilian would make him "gasp and stare." Whence
does he derive his doctrine that Ulpian can never give a bad reason,
never use an unnecessary word, or give a superfluous explanation or
reflexion? For him Ulpian is a superman, as is, presumably, Paul
also. He tells us that "atquin" is too "unruhig" for a classical jurist
and in a study of the texts employing this word, he rejects them all,
this a priori assumption being the starting point. In 42 ZEITS. DER
SAV.-ST. 515 et seq., Kfibler has an exhaustive discussion of this
matter. He points out inter alia that "atquin" is not used by the
Byzantine writers in their Latin work. The inference is that they found
it in the texts and did not insert it. On D. 29. I. 40. pr. (Paul) Beseler
strikes out the words "et quomodo possunt," with the comment that they
are not necessary.8 As they were not necessary Paul could not have
written them. But it so chances that there is hardly a word in the
Digest which has better evidence of authenticity. These words, sub-
stantially, were in the enactment that Paul is discussing. It is quoted
in D. 29. I. I: "faciant igitur testamenta quomodo volent, faciant
quomodo poterint. .. ." No doubt they might have been added there,
too, by the compilers, though it is hard to see why. But it is clear that
I ibid. 71; 2 ibid. 35, 105; 4 ibid. 255, etc. As to P. Sent. see, e. g., i ibid. 99
and 4 ibid. 336.
"2 ibid. 21; 4 ibid. 254.
8I ibid. 99; 3 ibid. 164; 4 ibid. 118. As to the Opiniones see also 2 Lenel, Pal-
ingenesia juris civilis juris consultoruin reliquac (1889) iooi, cited by Beseler.
52 Beilriige, etc. 14; 4 ibid. 18. S-3 ibid. 121; 4 ibid. 250, 282.
4 ibid. 250. 82 ibid. io.
INTERPOLATIONS IN THE DIGEST
they were not so added. They are in Gaius, "quomodo velint vel
quomodo possint permittitur testamentum facere." 89  They are also in
the Regulae of Ulpian, "permissum est illis quomodocumque vellent,
quomodocumque possent testari."' 0 It will be noted that the most turgid
of all the forms is that of Ulpian. Things of this kind hardly inspire
confidence in the a priori method even in the hands of so unmistakably
competent a man as Beseler.
In 4 Beitrdge, etc. 124 et seq., Beseler discusses D. 9. 2. 23. 2, 3.
Up. The Aquilian action is brought in respect of a slave killed.
Ulpian quotes, or is made to quote, Julian as saying that if the owner
had been instituted on condition of freeing the slave, and the death
made it impossible to do so, so that the hereditas was lost, "in aestima-
tionem etiam hereditatis pretium me consecuturum." Beseler objects
to some of this on various grounds: the only point with which we are
concerned is that he holds the "etiam" to be "sinnlos." He tells us
that, putting the matter to his class and asking what is recovered besides
the value of the slave, expecting the answer "that of the hereditas"
he got instead from a freshman, Herr Marius Molsen, the unexpected
answer: "The value of the hereditas less that of the slave," since to get
the horeditas he must free, and lose the slave. This acute remark
Beseler accepts and holds that as he gets the value of the slave and the
hereditas, less the value of the slave, the "etiam" has no meaning.
But, though the student is to be congratulated, the "etiam" is not
"sinnlos." What he loses by freeing is the present value of the slave:
what he recovers under the lex is his highest value in the last year.
And of course there might be other accessions. The "value of the
slave" has two different meanings and Beseler argues as if they were
the same. He will recover the value of the hereditas as well as what-
ever else there may be in the slave's "value."
In 3 Beitrdge, etc. 39, in his discussion of the word "attamen"
he observes, on D. 47. 14. I. 3 = Coll. II. 8. 3, to avoid the difficulty
that the word "attamen" occurs in both, that the Collatio often departs
from the juristic style. This seems entirely to miss the point. No
doubt the occurrence of the word in the Collatio would prove little for
its use by classical jurists. The point is however that this is the same
text, and the appearance of the word in the Collatio version of the text
increases the evidence for its authenticity unless, indeed, it is Beseler's
contention that the compilers used the Collatio. At page 59, in his dis-
cussion of "contendere," he comes on a similar case.9' Here the argu-
ment is altered. It may be, he says, that the compilers of the Digest
and the writer of the Collatio used the same glossed edition of Ulpian.
In that case the linguistic habits of the author of the Collatio have
nothing to do with the matter. The evidence for the incriminated
word is carried further back, and in view of the somewhat unlikely
nature of the hypothesis that they had happened on the same glossed
2. 114. 923. 10. "D. 9. 2. 5. I. Coll. 7.3. 4 .
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edition, one is inclined to prefer the view that the word was in the
original text. On page 83 there is another case: D. 9. 2. 27. 10 =
C01. 12. 7. 8. Here it is put more strongly: "die Kompilatoren
scheinen den glossierten Text vor sich gehabt zu haben."
In 3 Beitrdge, etc. 141, he objects against a critic who says of a
solution of his that it is "juristisch unhaltbar," that this is a "wohilfeile
W6rtlein" and no argument. This is no doubt correct, yet he himself
not uncommonly objects to a passage in the Digest that it is "unjuris-
tisch" without further explanation. 92 Indeed he seems rather to resent
being asked to give reasons. He says, with truth, that it must not be
assumed that he has none, but he adds that he cannot be expected to be
so explicit as in lecturing to a class of students, and that he omits reasons
because they will be clear to qualified persons. This is optimistic:
even trained minds do not move along the same lines. But the remark
has another point of interest. He does not claim to be always right:
infallibility is "ilbermenschlich" (though he seems inclined to attribute
this quality to Ulpian). Where his reason may chance to be wrong,
is it assumed that a properly equipped reader will divine it? As it is
only good reasons that readers could be expected to see for themselves,
this is in effect a claim that-his reasons, except where he gives. them,
are necessarily sound. Where he says, as he not unfrequently does.
"Unrichtig So and So," it may be doubted whether "So and So" will
feel that the proof is adequate.
There is a well-known piece of medieval controversy which is entitled
"de ineptiis cuiusdam idiotae." Beseler does not go so far as this, but
his treatment of his critics lacks urbanity. His manner led Kiibler
to protest and invite him not to reject the more courteous methods
nowadays in use. To this he replied that he does not agree that these
times are "h6flich" and he adds: "Sie haben doch auch im Felde
gestanden, verehrter lieber Herr Kiibler." 3 For him literary contro-
versy is a form of warfare in which the object is to defeat the enemy,
not a discussion in which colleagues with different opinions are seeking
to arrive at the truth., Most of us offend in this way occasionally, but
Beseler seems to erect it into a principle. It is difficult for him to
believe that an opponent can be in good faith or can possibly be right. His
violent attacks on England are perhaps excusable: indeed they need not
be taken seriously, since he tells us94 that it is an advocate's duty to cor-
rect the truth in the interest of a "schutzwiirdig" client. But, when all
deductions are made there are few modern Romanists from whom so
much can be learnt as from this very able writer.
9 5
"E. g., 3 Beitriige, etc. 24.
4 ibid. 257. ' 4 ibid. 256.
"'While this article was in proof, Prof. A. Berger of Vienna kindly sent to the
writer a copy of his review of 4 Beseler, Beitrilge in the (1923) ZErrscHRIFr FUR
VERGLEICHENDE REcHTSWISSENSCHAr, 328 et seq., which will be found to deal,
in the course of a very judicious criticism, with many of the points to which atten-
tion is called in the foregoing remarks on Beseler's work.
